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Abstract: This paper investigates a dual-channel supply chain consisting of a 
risk-neutral manufacturer and a risk-averse retailer. The manufacturer offers a 
consumer returns policy in the online channel, in which consumers face 
valuation uncertainty. We use conditional value-at-risk (CVaR) criterion to 
evaluate the risk-averse behaviour of the retailer. We examine how consumer 
returns policy and risk-averse behaviour influence the equilibrium solutions 
and supply chain agents’ performance. It is shown that the manufacturer’s 
optimal returns policy is related to consumer types. If the consumer has a 
moderate valuation of the product, the optimal returns policy depend on the 
retailer’s risk-averse level. We observe a counter-intuitive phenomenon, the 
retailer’s expected utility may increase under the double pressure of 
manufacturer encroachment and better returns service. Furthermore, a buyback 
revenue-sharing contract is offered to coordinate the dual-channel supply chain 
when the refund is endogenous. Finally, we explore several extensions. 
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1 Introduction 
New commercial patterns and opportunities are being created in the ear of e-commerce. 
Manufacturers can open direct channels (e.g. online stores or catalog sales) apart from the 
traditional reselling channels. This causes competition between the manufacturers and the 
resellers, a phenomenon called “manufacturer encroachment” (Arya et al., 2007; Li and 
Gilbert et al., 2014). For example, Estée Lauder and Johnson & Johnson in cosmetics 
industry, Samsung and Sony in electronics industry and Nike, Adidas and Levi Strauss 
and Co. (Levi’s) in fashion industry etc., they all have their own direct channels and 
traditional reselling channels (Xiong et al., 2012; Hsiao and Chen, 2013; Moon and Yao, 
2013). Introducing a direct channel can help firms increase market size, obtain more 
direct feedbacks from consumers, boost the total supply chain profits and mitigate double 
marginalization (Chiang et al., 2003; Li and Gilbert et al., 2015). Simultaneously，e-
commerce also changes consumer purchasing behaviour. Under Internet transactions, 
consumers can easily shopping through various websites. Transactions are no longer 
constrained by time and distance. However, some psychological factors raise consumers’ 
concerns about online shopping since consumers are unable to see and inspect the 
products before making their purchases (Hsiao and Chen, 2012). Further, although online 
descriptions by images or videos can help consumers learn about the products, online 
shopping is lack of emotional experiences and directing instructions, or the goods may be 
lost or damaged during the delivery. Therefore, opening a direct channel, on one hand, 
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strengthens the competitiveness of manufacturers; on the other hand, it also brings about 
additional challenges in customer services. One of the top concerns of online shopping is 
the difficulty in returning unsatisfactory purchases (Lee, 2002). Generally, more returns 
happen in the online channel than in the traditional channel (Rao et al., 2014). 
In response to the purchasing uncertainty of online products, the manufacturers often 
offer a variety of returns policies to alleviate consumers’ psychological burden. In 
practice, two major electronic products manufacturers, Samsung Electronics 
(http://www.samsung.com/cn/home) and Apple Inc. (http://store.apple.com/cn) promise 
returns policies for their online sales. Another example in the cosmetics industry such as 
Dabao, a sub-brand of Johnson & Johnson Company (http://dabao.tmall.com), promises a 
generous “no questions asked” money-back guarantee for consumers. It has been 
demonstrated that more than 70 percent of consumers would consider returns policies 
before their purchasing (Trager, 2000). Therefore, returns service not only can enhance 
firm’s competitiveness (Sullivan, 2009), but also can increase consumers’ confidence in 
the product quality. Obviously, providing a consumer returns policy is a useful 
mechanism for the sellers (Wood, 2001). Further, according to Suwelack et al. (2011), 
returns policies stimulate market demand and positively impact consumers’ willingness 
to pay. However, the negative implications of the returns policy cannot be ignored. Too 
liberal returns policies often give rise to excessive amount of consumer returns and 
inventory. In addition, dealing with returned products consumes manufacturers’ massive 
time and increases reverse logistics cost. Therefore, how to design an optimal returns 
policy is very important for manufacturers.  
      Manufacturer encroachment has a significant impact on the retailers (resellers) in 
the traditional channel (Collinger, 1998; Machlis, 1998; Tsay and Agrawal, 2004; Arya et 
al., 2007; Li and Gilbert et al., 2014, 2015). Retailers believe that cannibalization effect is 
bound to happen in the dual-channel supply chain. The manufacturers not only carve up 
the market by establishing their direct channels, but also offer the returns policy to offset 
the weakness of the online shopping. These factors may lead to a higher degree of 
uncertainty and greater competitive pressure for retailers. Especially, when the market 
demand is uncertain, the retailers tend to behave in a risk-averse way (Choi et al., 2008). 
Thus, it is of great importance to incorporate the retailers’ risk aversion into the decision 
framework in the manufacturer encroachment situation.  
However, to the best of our knowledge, little research has been published on the 
optimal decisions in the manufacturer encroachment situations simultaneously 
considering the manufacturer’s returns policy and the retailer’ risk-averse behaviour. This 
paper attempts to fill this research gap. More specifically, we consider a dual-channel 
supply chain with a risk-neutral manufacturer and a risk-averse retailer, in which the 
manufacturer produces a single type of products and sells them via his own online 
channel and the traditional retail channel, and offers consumers a returns policy for his 
online channel. We will examine the following issues: how would a risk-averse retailer 
make her optimal order decisions in response to the manufacturer’s different returns 
policies for its online channel? How will the combinational factors of the manufacturer’s 
different return policies and the retailer’s risk-averse attitude influence their decisions 
and performance? What is the manufacturer’s optimal returns policy facing 
heterogeneous consumers? How to coordinate the dual-channel supply chain in the 
presence of consumer returns and a risk-averse retailer? Does the returns policy play an 
important role in improving the competitiveness of the online channel? Does providing 
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the returns policy always hurt the retailer’s utility? To answer these questions, we 
evaluate the retailer’s risk level using conditional value-at-risk (CVaR) criterion, which is 
widely applied in the field of finance and economic literature (Alexander and Baptista, 
2004; Zhu and Fukushima, 2009). In addition, the market demand is uncertain and 
refund-amount related (Xiao et al., 2010; Liu et al., 2014). The objective of the retailer is 
to maximize her expected utility and the objective of the manufacturer is to maximize his 
expected profit.  
The rest of this article is organized as follows. The relevant literature is reviewed in 
Section 2. Section 3 describes the parameters notation and each agent’s objective 
functions. In Section 4, we first model the dual-channel supply chain when the refund 
amount is exogenous and study the impacts of the consumer returns policy and the 
retailer’s risk attitude on agents’ decisions and performance. Then we study the situation 
when the refund amount is endogenous. In Section 5, we design a contract to coordinate 
the dual-channel supply chain with endogenous refund amount. Followed by Section 5, 
Section 6 uses numerical examples to reveal two important impacts of returns policy. 
Section 7 describes several model extensions. Section 8 summarizes the results and 
suggests several possible future work. 
2 Literature review 
The relevant literature can be divided into two streams: the first concerns with 
optimal decisions of the consumer returns policy in supply chains; the second is related to 
modelling the risk-averse behaviour of agents in supply chains.  
There is rich literature related to the optimal decisions of the consumer returns policy 
in supply chains. For example, Hsiao and Chen (2012) considered a two-echelon supply 
chain with an Internet seller and heterogeneous consumers. In response to the product 
quality uncertainty, Internet seller offered returns policies. They characterized the optimal 
returns policies and pricing strategy under an exogenous quality, and showed all 
inappropriate returns could be eliminated by carefully designed returns policies. Chen 
and Bell (2012) proposed a dual-channel structure including a returnable channel and a 
nonreturnable channel. The impact of different returns policies on the optimal decisions 
and profit was investigated in such a structure. Sun et al. (2013) studied a multi-period 
acquisition pricing and remanufacturing decision problem. Products returned in their 
paper were assumed price-sensitive. They acquired the solution structure of the optimal 
remanufacturing quantity and derived a monotonic pricing policy. Chen and Grewal 
(2013) studied the optimal returns policy with two competing retailers (a well-established 
retailer and a new entrant). The Stackelberg game was adopted to determine whether the 
new entrant retailer should implement a full-refund policy or a no-refund policy. Ren et 
al. (2014) studied a dual-channel supply chain with price and service competition 
involving consumer returns policies. They analysed the optimal pricing decisions in both 
centralized and decentralized scenarios, and designed a new contract to coordinate the 
dual-channel supply chain. Ruiz-Benitez and Muriel (2014) considered a supply chain 
consisting of a manufacturer and a retailer facing stochastic demand. Two returns 
policies, full refund and no return, were compared in terms of the optimal wholesale 
price, ordering quantities and profits. They proved that “double marginalization” effect 
was milder under the full-refund policy. Huang and Yang (2015) considered a contract 
design problem when the retailer provided a full returns policy. They derived the optimal 
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menu of contracts and investigated the impact of the retailer’s market value on the supply 
chain performance. Although a lot of researches studied about consumer returns policy, 
the majority of them focused on a single channel supply chain. In our paper, we will 
develop a Stackelberg game of a dual-channel supply chain and analyse the equilibrium 
solutions with a parameterized refund amount. 
When the manufacturers open their direct channels, the channel competition will 
bring much more pressure on the traditional retailers and then they may have risk-averse 
behaviour. Risk aversion is a common concept in economics and finance, which can be 
measured using Mean-Variance (MV) approach (Markowitz, 1959), Value-at-Risk (VaR) 
and Conditional Value-at-Risk (CVaR) (Rockafellar and Uryasev, 2002; Alexander et al., 
2004). From the late 1990s, the risk-aversion concept has been introduced into supply 
chain management. Lau and Lau (1999) analysed a buyback issue in a supply chain 
consisting of a manufacturer and a retailer, and each agent had a mean-variance objective 
function. Gan et al. (2005) used VaR method to study channel coordination with a risk-
neutral manufacturer and a risk-averse retailer. They found that a risk-sharing contract 
could transfer the retailer’s risk and coordinate the entire supply chain. Ma et al. (2012) 
considered a risk-neutral manufacturer and a risk-averse retailer in a Nash bargaining 
game. They adopted CVaR criterion and showed how bargaining power and risk-averse 
level influenced agents’ decisions. Li and Chen et al. (2014) investigated a dual-channel 
supply chain in which the risk-neutral manufacturer with a direct channel produced one 
perishable product and the risk-averse retailer faced a price dependent stochastic demand. 
CVaR method was applied to gauge the retailer’s risk-averse level and a Nash bargaining 
problem was built to analyse the decisions of agents.  
In terms of the consumer returns issues in supply chain management, there are a 
limited number of papers considering the agents’ risk behaviour. Liu et al. (2012) 
formulated an analytical model with both demand and consumer return uncertainties and 
solved the optimal price, consumer return, and level of modularity for a mass 
customization (MC) manufacturer. The MC manufacturer sold MC products directly to 
consumers. They used the mean-variance (MV) method to measure the MC 
manufacturer’ risk aversion level. They found that the optimal decisions on retail price, 
refund rate, and modularity level were decreasing in the degree of manufacturer’s risk 
aversion. Choi et al. (2013) explored consumer full returns policy and no return policy 
under fashion MC program. By modelling the optimization objective of the risk averse 
MC fashion brand using the mean-variance method, they derived the closed-form of the 
optimal solution under either returns policy. Liu and He (2013) examined the optimal 
decisions in a two-echelon supply chain facing uncertain demand and uncertain consumer 
returns. They used the MV objective framework to measure the decision-makers’ risk 
preference. The results showed that only buyback contract could coordinate the supply 
chain when the agents were risk-neutral or risk-averse. Yoo (2014) applied a mean-risk 
model to measure the manufacturer’s risk. The aim was to study the quality-related 
consumer returns issue where the buyer in the supply chain decided the optimal returns 
policy for consumers and the upstream manufacturer made the production quality 
decision. Because MV equally evaluates desirable upside outcomes and undesirable 
downside outcomes, and VaR is an incoherent risk measure (Ma et al., 2012), CVaR 
method was proposed to overcome the weakness of MV and VaR and has been applied in 
many industries. However, there are few researches to measure the risk-averse behaviour 
in supply chain management through CVaR method, especially in dual-channel supply 
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chain. This paper will complement the literature by adopting the CVaR method to 
measure the retailer’s risk-averse behaviour in a dual-channel supply chain. Further, we 
analyse the optimal decisions under the online consumer returns policy and the impacts 
of the risk-averse indicator on the optimal decisions.  
This paper investigates agents’ optimal decisions in dual-channel supply chains where 
the online channel provides consumer returns policies. We also consider the retailer’s risk 
aversion using the CVaR criterion. The differences of this paper from the literature can 
be explained as follows. We consider the consumer returns policy in a dual-channel 
supply chain, which explicitly models the conflict relationship between supply chain 
members and the competition relationship between two channels; whereas the majority of 
literature about returns policy concentrated on a single channel. In those limited number 
of studies on consumer returns policy in supply chain management, they either assume 
that the supply chain members are completely rational or evaluate the agents’ risk-
aversion using MV method (Liu and He, 2013; Yoo, 2014). In this paper we use CVaR 
measure, which is consistent with agents’ normal psychological reactions to risk because 
it reflects the downside-risk level. By using CVaR criterion, we are able to evaluate the 
impact of the retailer’s worst-case risk behaviour in the presence of manufacturer 
encroachment with consumer returns policy. To have a clearer view of how our work 
differs from the previous relevant studies, we compare our paper with the aforementioned 
literature on consumer returns in supply chain in Table 1. These papers are compared 
mainly in five aspects. The first column in Table 1 represents whether the paper considers 
consumer returns policy in online channel and/or offline channel and FR, PR, NR denote 
full returns, partial returns and no return respectively. The second column represents the 
channel structure studied in each paper (e.g. one echelon or two echelon). The rest three 
columns show that whether the paper considers supply chain members’ risk behaviour, 
who has risk-averse or risk-seeking attitude and the methods used to measure the risk 
attitude. 
 
Table 1 Summary of the literature review (consumer returns in supply chain) 
 
Reference On / Off CS 
Risk 
Preference 
Member Method 
Su (2009) -/ FR,PR T N   
Xiao et al. (2010) -/FR,NR T N   
Liu and Choi et al. (2012) -/PR O N, A Seller MV 
Chen and Bell (2012) -/FR,NR O N   
Hsiao and Chen (2012) FR,PR,NR/- O N   
Chen and Grewal (2013) -/FR,NR T N   
Li et al. (2013) FR,PR,NR/- O N   
Liu and He (2013) -/FR T A, S 
Manufacturer 
and  retailer 
MV 
Choi et al. (2013) -/FR,NR O A Seller MV 
Ren et al. (2014) FR / FR T N   
Li and Xu et al. (2014) -/ FR,PR O N   
Ruiz-Benitez and Muriel (2104) -/ FR,NR T N   
Yoo (2014) -/FR,NR T N&A Supplier MV 
Liu et al. (2014) -/PR T N   
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Huang and Yang (2015) -/FR T N   
Our paper FR,PR,NR/NR T N&A Retailer CVaR 
Note. T represents two echelon, O represents  echelon in the column Channel Structure. N 
represents neutral, A represents risk-averse and S is for risk-seeking in the column Risk Preference. 
3 Model description 
We consider a dual-channel supply chain consisting of a risk-neutral manufacturer (he) 
and a risk-averse retailer (she). At the beginning of the sales season, the manufacturer 
produces a single type of products at unit cost c and operates his own online channel with 
a consumer returns policy. A make-to-order policy is adopted in the online channel, while 
the retailer places an order to the manufacturer before the sales, this is because the 
demand in the retail channel is relatively stable and predictable. Such mixed strategy of 
make-to-order and make-to-stock is supported by Adan and Wal (1998), Carr and 
Duenyas (2000) and Li and Chen et al. (2014). We assume the manufacturer is a 
Stackelberg leader, that is, the manufacturer decides his wholesale price in the first move. 
Then the retailer, as a follower, makes her order decision after observing the 
manufacturer’s choice. The channel structure is shown in the Figure 1. In Section 7, we 
will extend the model to incorporate both agents’ pricing strategies. 
 
Figure 1  Dual-channel supply chain structure 
 
 
 
The selling prices in the retail channel and in the online channel are 
rp  and mp
respectively. Some studies assume the consistent pricing, i.e.
r mp p , e.g. strategy is 
considered in previous papers such as Cattani et al. (2006), Cai et al. (2009) and Wen et 
al. (2013), they assumed that the manufacturer committed to  adopt the same price on the 
online channel and the retail channel. However, the inconsistent pricing, i.e..
r mp p ., is 
more practical. Several market surveys have found that online prices are usually lower 
than offline prices within a certain range of 4-16% for the reasons such as lower barriers 
to entry the market and lower operational costs of online channel (e.g. Brynjolfsson and 
Smith, 2000; Tang and Xing, 2001; Lo et al., 2013; Bhatnagar and Syam, 2014). Taking 
into account the above observations, we assume that the online price is not greater than 
the retail price, but not less than the average of the production cost and the retail price 
(i.e. ( ) 2r m rp c p p   ). Here the assumption ( ) 2r mp c p   is for the simplicity of 
analysis in the following, but also reflects the observation that the online price is within a 
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reasonable range of the offline price
rp . We assume that the manufacturer offers a 
consumer returns policy to the online channel, but the retailer does not offer a return 
policy to the offline consumers. The former can be understood as the manufacturer’s 
customer service to overcome the disadvantage that consumers in the online channel are 
difficult to judge the fitness of the product without physically observing and trying it. The 
latter may be justified as follows. For the bricks-and-mortar stores, the retailer has 
displayed proper samples of various product models on the shelves, and/or hired highly 
qualified sales people, so the consumers can be ensured to find the right product before 
committing the purchase. In addition, consumers are able to inspect and try-out the 
product in the retail store, which can further decrease the likelihood of a mismatch. 
Therefore we assume that only the online channel provides the consumer returns service 
in this paper. The returns policy is parameterized by a policy parameter f and f
represents the refund amount. If 0f  , it means no return is allowed. If mf p , it 
represents full refunds (or full returns). Besides, the refund amount between zero and the 
selling price implies that the manufacturer offers partial refunds (or partial returns) to 
consumers. For simplicity, we will first assume the refund amount as an exogenous factor 
similar to Xiao et al., (2010) and Liu et al., (2014). Later on we will treat the refund 
amount f as an endogenous decision variable. Much literature has shown that the 
amount of returned products has a strong positive relation with the refund amount (Xiao 
et al., 2010; Liu et al., 2014). In our model, consumers face valuation uncertainty in the 
manufacturer’s online channel. At first, consumers attempt to purchase the products and 
their valuations are only realized after purchase (Su, 2009). So in the online channel, we 
assume that consumer valuation V is an independent and identically distributed random 
variable with distribution ( )G  . These realizations are not known until the consumer 
receives the product. A consumer’s surplus of keeping the product bought online is
mv p , and the surplus of returning this product is mf p . A consumer with post-
purchase valuation v  will return the product if and only if
m mv p f p   . Thus 
probability of consumer returns is ( ) ( )G f prob v f  . 
Shulman et al. (2010) mentioned that 95% of the consumer returns belonged to 
nondefective products that were not what the consumer was expecting (false failure 
returns). For the nondefective returns, timely disposition such as refurbish, repackaging 
and reshelf becomes paramount rather than remanufacture (Crocker and Letizia, 2014). 
Therefore, we assume that the returned products from consumers cannot be resold within 
this selling period due to the need for inspection, repackaging, and reshelving (Chen and 
Bell, 2012). All leftover products are salvaged at prices s . Meanwhile, the manufacturer 
incurs a cost l  related to handling the returned products including verifying purchase, 
repackaging, reshelving and carrying cost during the return processes. In Section 7, we 
will extend this assumption to consider that the returned products are remanufactured by 
the manufacturer and the cost structure is also changed.    
The notations and the parameters are defined as follows: 
i    i r , m , where r  denotes the retail channel and m  denotes the manufacturer’s 
online channel;  
w   the wholesale price, a decision variable of the manufacturer. We assume
mw p , 
otherwise the retail channel becomes meaningless since she would prefer to buy products 
from the online channel; 
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rq   the order quantity in the retail channel, a decision variable of the retailer; 
   the degree of consumer loyalty to the retail channel, i.e. 1   represents the 
degree of consumer loyalty to the online channel, and 0 1  ; 
c   the production cost per unit and c w ; 
s   the salvage value per unit for the returned and leftover product, here we assume 
s c ; 
V   a random variable which represents the consumer’s post-purchase valuation with 
an increasing distribution ( )G  ; 
f   the refund amount in the online channel with 0 mf p  ; 
l    the unit cost of handling consumer returns undertaken by the manufacturer, to 
make the return meaningful, we assume that l s  otherwise the manufacturer won’t 
recycling returned products; 
i   the returns sensitivity parameter, it represents the demand’s sensitivity to the 
returns policy in each channel, here assume the returns policy’s effect on the online 
channel is greater than it on the retail channel by 0 r m   (Li et al., 2013).  
The total market demand is stochastic, which can be described as: D D   , where 
D  is the basic product demand and   is a random variable that suggests the market 
demand uncertainty following a uniform distribution on [ , ]U U  with 0D U  , ( )  , 
( )  are the density and the cumulative function of   respectively. Following Hua et al. 
(2010), Dan et al. (2012) and Lu and Liu (2013), we also assume that the demand 
functions are linear in the prices and the refund amount. The prices are assumed 
exogenous in the basic model and this assumption will be relaxed in Section 7. Demand 
functions are formulated as follows:  
 
r r m rD D p p f        (1) 
 (1 )m m r mD D p p f         (2) 
The parameter   is the cross-price sensitivity with 0 1  . 
i represents the 
intensity of competition between the two channels with regards to f . Note that return 
compensation can stimulate consumer demand and correspondingly increase sales (Li et 
al., 2013), if the refund amount increases by one unit, 
m  units of the demand will 
increase in the online channel, meanwhile 
r  units of the demand will be lost in the retail 
channel. 
The manufacturer’s profit is:  
 ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )m r m m m mw c q p c G f D p c f s l G f D               (3) 
In Equation (3), the first term corresponds to the revenue sold to the retailer, the 
second term comes from the products sold at his direct channel and not returned by 
consumers, and the third term represents the salvaging revenue from products that are 
bought but returned by the consumer in the online direct channel. It should be noted that 
the third term could be negative. The retailer’s profit is given as follows: 
 ( , ) [ ]r r r r r r rp min q D w q s q D
        (4) 
In Equation (4), the first term corresponds to the retailer’s sales revenue, the second 
term represents the money paid to the manufacturer and the third term represents the 
salvage value of the leftover products if there are any. 
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Denote ( ) max( ,0)   . We apply CVaR criterion to evaluate the risk-averse 
behaviour of the retailer. When the retailer places an order quantity 
rq  to the 
manufacturer, her utility under  -CVaR criterion is defined as follows (Rockafellar and 
Uryasev, 2000): 
 
1
( ) max min ,0r r
R
CVaR E

   

 
     

 
Where   denotes a risk-averse indicator of the retailer and   represents her target 
profit level ( ( ))r rz q  based on the VaR measurement. ( ( ))rz q  is also the  -quantile 
of ( )r rq  and defined as follows: ( ( )) inf { Pr( ( ) ) (1 )}r rz q v q v       . When 1 
, the retailer is risk-neutral and when   tends to 0, the retailer becomes more risk-averse. 
As CVaR is a continuous risk measure, we obtain the following equivalent functions to 
denote the retailer’s utility under  -CVaR criterion: 
 
1
1
( )
1 1
( )
( )
( ) ( ) , ( )
( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )[ ] ( ) , ( )
r m r r
r
q p p f
D
r
r r r r m r
U
r
r r r r m r r r m r
U
CVaR
p s
p w q d q D f p p
p s
p s w s q p s D f p p d q D f p p
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



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           


  




 


 
        


                 



  (5) 
The retailer’s utility function as well as the above inference process are provided in 
the Appendix 1. 
4 Model analysis 
In this section, we consider the case of exogenous prices. First the equilibrium results are 
derived, and the sensitivity analyses of equilibrium results are provided in Section 4.1. 
Impacts of the consumer returns policy and the risk-averse indicator on two agents in the 
supply chain are given in the Section 4.2. 
4.1 Equilibrium Analysis 
In the Stackelberg game, the manufacturer first decides the wholesale price, then the 
retailer decides the order quantity. According to Equation (5), we have: 
（1） If 1( )r m r rq D p p f    
      , then
( )
( ) 0r
r
CVaR
w s
q
 
   

.  
So 1( )r m r rq D p p f    
       . Note that this case is the boundary of the 
feasible regions, the solution is included in the other case, so the paper just focuses on the 
following situation. 
（2） If 1( )r m r rq D p p f    
      , then 
 
2( )[ ]
( ) ( )
4
r r m r r
r r r
p s q p p f D U
CVaR p w q
U
    

     
     (6) 
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The manufacturer’s expected profit is as follows: 
          ( ) ( ) [ ( ) ( )] [(1 ) ]m r m r m mE w c q p c G f f s l D p p f                     (7)        
Using standard backward induction, we obtain the equilibrium solution (
rq
 , w ) as 
follows: 
 
( )1
[( ) ]
2
r
r r m r
r
U p c
q D U f p p
p s

  

     

  (8) 
 [( ) ]
4 2
r r
r m r
p s p c
w D U f p p
U
  

          (9) 
Some conditions are required to ensure the system is physically meaningful. First, to 
keep the dual-channel supply chain structure feasible, both channels’ demands must be 
non-negative. Second, *
mw p . Accordingly, we obtain the following constraints: 
min[( ) ( ) ,(2 )]m r r m mp p D U p p c        and [ ,1]  , 
where 
( )
2 2
m r r
m r
D U p p p s
U p p c
 


   
 
 
. 
To examine the impacts of the refund amount and the risk-averse indicator on the 
decision variables, we obtain the following results: 
Proposition 4.1: Under the conditions [ ,1]  , there are some properties of the 
equilibrium solutions as follows: 
*
0r
q
f



, 0
w
f



; 
*
0r
q




, 0
w




; 0
w




, 
*
0r
q




. 
The proof is given in Appendix 2
1
. In Proposition 4.1, the first group reveals that the 
retailer’s order quantity is decreasing in f . This is intuitive because the demand in the 
online channel becomes larger as f  increases; and this brings about more intense 
competition between two channels. Facing with a shrinking market, the retailer reduces 
her order quantity to avoid too many leftovers. As for the manufacturer, a larger refund 
amount f will decrease its profit from the online channel and break the equilibrium 
between two channels. This would lead to his willingness to charge a lower wholesale 
price to stimulate a higher order quantity from the retailer. In other words, as f increases, 
the manufacturer tends to shift more order quantity towards the retailer channel by 
lowering the wholesale price. For the influences of the risk-averse indicator , the retailer 
is decreasing her order quantity when   tends to 0 (i.e. becomes more risk-averse). On 
the contrary, the manufacturer will decrease his wholesale price and transfer his 
cooperative willingness to the retailer when the retailer becomes less risk-averse.  
The third group in Proposition 4.1 indicates that the wholesale price and the order 
quantity increase in . When   is small, the basic demand in the retail channel is low. So 
too many order quantity may give rise to excessive leftovers. However, as   increases, 
                                               
1 All the appendixes are provide online 
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the basic demand in the retail channel becomes larger. The retailer bears less risk in 
overstocking. Her order quantity is responsive to the increase in . As regards the effect 
of   on the wholesale price, when   is small, the manufacturer can earn considerable 
profit in his online channel. Then, he is willing to set a lower wholesale price to 
encourage the retailer to order more. As   increases, the manufacturer knows that the 
retailer is bound to increase her order quantity. Motivated by this, the manufacturer 
increases the wholesale price to make more money. 
4.2 Impacts of the returns policy and the risk-averse indicator on agents’ 
performance 
In this section, we discuss the impacts of the refund amount f  and the retailer’s risk-
averse indictor   on two agents’ performance. First, we examine how the refund amount 
influences the retailer’s expected utility. 
Proposition 4.2: （1）For the fixed refund amount f , the retailer’s expected utility is 
monotonically increasing as her risk-averse indicator   increases. The risk-neutral 
retailer will gain the most expected utility. （2）For the fixed risk-averse indicator  , 
there exists a threshold 
( ) 2
3
m r r
r
r r r
D U p p p sU
f
p c
  
 
   
  

 such that: 
i) if 0rf  , then the retailer’s expected utility is monotonically decreasing in f .  
ii) if 0 r mf p  , then the retailer will achieve the maximum expected utility when 
rf f . 
iii)if 
r mf p , then the retailer’s expected utility is monotonically increasing in f . 
The proof is given in Appendix 3. As the retailer’s risk-averse indicator  increases 
(towards less risk-aversion), the retailer’s expected utility is increasing. This result 
highlights an important conclusion that the retailer could achieve the highest expected 
utility if she is risk-neural. Proposition 4.2 (2) indicates that at a given risk-averse level of 
the retailer, the relationship between the retailer’s expected utility and the manufacturer’s 
refund amount can be characterized by a single threshold value 
rf . Here rf  can be 
interpreted as a parameter that is associated with the market environment such as base 
demand, degree of consumer loyalty, etc. In particular, when
r mf p , the retailer’s 
expected utility will monotonically increase in f  for any rf f . This is a counter-
intuitive phenomenon, because: (i) manufacturer encroachment arouses channel 
competition between the retailer and the manufacturer; (ii) the manufacturer is enhancing 
the return service in his online channel to attract more consumers, which should intensify 
the competition between two channels. We explain this surprising phenomenon from two 
aspects. On one hand, larger degree of consumer loyalty to the retail channel and higher 
basic market demand ensure higher market demand sharing for the retailer. This will 
decrease retailer’s risk of ordering. On the other hand, because the wholesale price will 
decrease as the increase of f . The manufacturer would like to compensate the retailer by 
reducing the wholesale price when he raises the refund amount in his direct channel. 
When the basic market demand is relatively low, i.e. 0rf  , the retailer will face higher 
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risk of ordering. At the same time, higher refund amount will also bring huge damage to 
retailer’s basic market sharing. Therefore, the retailer’s expected utility is decreasing in
f . When market demand is moderate, i.e. 0 r mf p  , the retailer’s expected utility is 
first increasing then decreasing in f . There is enough market demand when the refund 
amount keeps in a low level, thus retailer’s expected utility is first increasing in f .When
f gradually increases, retailer’s market demand share shrinks, thus retailer’s expected 
utility starts decreasing.  
The following numerical experiments are used to verify the results. In our 
experiments, most parameters are set up based on the literature. For example,   and 
are set up based on Li and Chen et al. (2014) , D is based on Lu and Liu (2013), s is 
based on Yue and Liu (2006), c is based on Khouja et al. (2013), l  is based on Liu et al. 
(2014), U  is based on Huang and Yang (2015), and
rp , mp  are based on Bose and An 
and (2007). However, 
r and m  are hypothetical because of the lack of data. Referring 
to the parameters in the above literature, we set up the basic parameters as follows:
40s  , 60c  , 10l  , 510D  , 210U  , 320rp  , 300mp  , 0.2r  , 0.3m  ,
0.6  ; and the constraint conditions of the game model can be satisfied. That is, the 
chosen parameters must satisfy the constraints we mentioned in order to make the models 
feasible and meaningful. In the following numerical experiments, some parameters may 
be varied from the standard setting to perform sensitivity analysis. In Figure 2, let 
270f  , 0.7  and 300f  , 0.7   respectively, we can see that the retailer’s 
expected utility is monotonically increasing as her risk-averse indicator   increases, this 
verifies Proposition 4.2 (1). 
 
Figure 2     The impacts of   on the retailer’s expected utility 
 
Next, we conduct three cases of simulations to verify Proposition 4.2 (2). We assume
40s  , 60c  , 10l  , 0.8  , 210U  , 320rp  , 300mp  , 0.2r  , 0.3m  , 
0.7  , 0.6  . Let 510D   as the first case, 570D   and 620D   as the second and 
third cases. The threshold values 
rf  are equal to -72.1538, 137.8462 and 312.8462 
respectively. From Figure 3, we can see that the retailer’s expected utility is 
monotonically decreasing, concave or monotonically increasing in f .  
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Figure 3     The impacts of f  on the retailer’s expected utility 
 
 
In the following proposition, we will examine the impacts of f  on the 
manufacturer’s expected profit from another perspective. We use the relative expected 
profit to measure the manufacturer’s performance. Assume consumer’s post-purchase 
valuation V follows a uniform distribution on [0, ]v  where 
mv p and this assumption is 
commonly used in consumers return literature such as Li and Xu et al. (2014) and Liu et 
al. (2014). Thus the manufacturer’s relative profit is defined as the difference between 
returns policy (RP) and no returns policy (NRP) (i.e. ( ) ( )
m m mRP NRP
E E     ). If 
0m  , then providing the returns option to consumers is better off for the 
manufacturer. If 0m  , then the manufacturer will not offer returns service. The next 
proposition characterizes the manufacturer’s best responses given . 
Proposition 4.3: Given the retailer’s risk-averse indicator  , there exists the thresholds 
1v  and 2v  such that:  
(1) if 
1v v , then it is optimal for the manufacturer to offer a partial returns policy; 
(2) if 
1 2v v v   and 0 1      , then it is optimal for the manufacturer to offer a 
partial returns policy; 
(3) if 
1 2v v v  and 0 1    , then it is optimal for the manufacturer to offer a full 
returns policy; 
(4) if 
2v v , then it is optimal for the manufacturer to offer the full returns policy,  
where  
1 ( )[( ) ]
4
r r m r r m
Y
v
p s D U p p p
X
U
   


    

, 
2 2(2 ) (2 )
2 2[( ) ]
r m r r m m r
m r
Y
v
p p c p p p c
X
D U p p
 
 

   
 
  
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( )[( ) ]
4
r r r m m rp s D U p p p
U M
   


    


, 
Y
M X
v
  , 
( )
( )
2
r r
m m
p c
X p c



   , 
23 2 ( ) (2 )[(1 ) ]m m m m m r mY p s l p p s l D p p            . 
Proposition 4.3 states that the manufacturer’s optimal returns policy can be characterized 
by the highest consumer’s valuation of the product. Prior to purchase, consumers are 
uncertain about the product’s fit with their tastes. A consumer faces a distribution of 
potential values which she might obtain after product trial. Consumers know the 
distribution of V , but no individual knows the exact value until she buys the product and 
tries it. Note that if 
mv p  means a consumer is satisfied with the product. Therefore, a 
higher v  means the proportion of the satisfied consumers is larger, or equivalently the 
proportion of the returns is smaller. A simple but useful construct to capture the effect of 
v on the selection on returns policy is to assume that the market consists of three types of 
consumers. One group has high valuation of the product, another group has low valuation 
and the rest consumers have moderate valuation of the product. Specifically, the high-
valuation type is marked as
HV V , the low-valuation type is L LV V  and the 
moderate valuation type is 
M MV V  ( 0 1L M    ) (Li and Xu et al., 2014). Thus 
the distributions of the high-valuation type and the low-valuation type are ~ [0, ]HV U v ,
~ [0, ]L LV U v  and ~ [0, ]M MV U v  respectively. Obviously, the high-valuation type 
has higher upper bound of V  than the other types. 
When the upper bound of V is relatively low (e.g.
1v v ), it can be interpreted as that 
the consumers belong to the low-valuation type. Due to the consumers’ low valuation of 
the product, the manufacturer may experience a relatively high proportion of returns, and 
therefore tends to offer partial returns policy to mitigate the risk instead of offering the 
full returns policy. Further, when the upper bound of V is moderate, the manufacturer’s 
optimal returns policy also counts on the retailer’s risk-averse level. When the retailer’s 
risk-averse level is relatively high (i.e.  is smaller than ), for the manufacturer, even if 
consumers has higher valuation compared with the low-valuation type, he will also 
provide the partial return policy to alleviate channel competition. However, if the 
retailer’s risk-averse level is low (i.e.   is greater than ), the manufacturer could 
provide the full returns policy to pursue higher profit. Moreover, when the upper bound 
of V is relatively high (e.g.
2v v ), our results show that a full returns policy is optimal 
for the manufacturer. Under this situation, consumers belong to the high-valuation type. 
In practice, consumers with higher valuation are willing to pay more and they also value 
service more than the low-valuation type. Besides, the proportion of the returns of high-
valuation type is smaller than the low-valuation type. Therefore, the manufacturer is 
motivated to offer a generous full returns policy to attract more high type consumers. 
The proof is found in Appendix 4. We use four experiments to verify the Proposition 
4.3. The data in Figure 4 is set as 40s  , 60c  , 10l  , 510D  , 210U  , 320rp  , 300mp  , 
0.2r  , 0.3m  , 0.7  , 0.6  . Here by calculation, we obtain 1 2247.6v  , 2 2362.5v  and 
0.8203  . When
12000v v  , 0.8  the manufacturer should adopt partial returns policy, 
which is consistent with Proposition 4.3 (1). When
1 22300v v v   and 0.8   , the 
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manufacturer should adopt partial returns policy, which verifies Proposition 4.3 (2). 
When 
1 22300v v v   and 0.9   , the manufacturer should adopt full returns 
policy, which verifies Proposition 4.3 (3). When
23000v v  and 0.8   , the 
manufacturer should adopt full returns policy, which is consistent with Proposition 4.3 
(4). 
 
Figure  4     The impacts of f on the manufacturer’s relative profit 
 
 
 
Next we will extend the model to the case with an endogenous refund amount. When 
the refund amount f  is an endogenous decision variable, the manufacturer will first 
decide his optimal returns policy and the wholesale price, then the retailer will choose her 
optimal order quantity based on the manufacturer’s decisions. Using standard backward 
induction, we obtain the equilibrium solution (
*wˆ , *f , *qˆ ) as follows: 
Corollary 4.1: When the refund amount is an endogenous decision variable, there exist 
the threshold values 
1v  and 2v  such that the unique equilibrium solutions (
*wˆ , *f , *qˆ ) 
are derived as follows: 
(1) if 
1v v ,then 
* ˆf f , 
(2) if 
1 2v v v  and 0 1      ,then 
* ˆf f , 
(3) if 
1 2v v v  and 0 1    , then 
*
mf p , 
(4) if 
2v v ,then 
*
mf p ,  
and * *ˆ [( ) ]
4 2
r r
r m r
p s p c
w D U f p p
U
  

 
      , 
*
* * * * ˆ2 ( )ˆˆ ˆ( , ) ( ) rr m r
r
U p w
q w f D U f p p
p s

  

     

, 
where 
1 2, ,v v  are defined in Proposition 4.3, 
2 ˆ ˆˆ ˆ 4ˆ
ˆ2
B B AC
f
A
  
 , ˆ 3A A  ，
ˆ 2B B  ， Cˆ C  , A , B and C are shown in Appendix 4. 
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The proof is given in Appendix 5. From Corollary 4.1, we can see that when f  is 
endogenous, the optimal decisions of the manufacturer and the retailer are not exclusive 
but are divided into two cases according to different scenarios. This is because f is 
restricted between 0 and
mp . Furthermore, the criteria of the optimal f are the same with 
those in the Proposition 4.3. As reflected in Corollary 4.1, when the the highest 
consumer’s valuation of the product v is low, the optimal solution of f is equal to fˆ  
and the manufacturer should provide the partial return policy. When v is high enough to 
surpass a certain threshold
2v , the manufacturer may provide the full return policy to 
stimulate larger demand. When v is moderate, the optimal solution of f is also related to 
the retailer’s risk-averse level. When the retailer’s risk-averse level is relatively high, for 
the manufacturer, he should provide the partial return policy to alleviate channel 
competition. However, if the retailer’s risk-averse level is low, the manufacturer could 
provide the full returns policy to pursue higher profit. 
Proposition 4.4: Given the refund amount f , when   increases in the interval[ , 1] , the 
manufacturer’s expected profit is increasing. 
The proof is given in Appendix 6. Proposition 4.4 implies that the manufacturer’s 
expected profit is always increasing in . This property is shown in Figure 5 using the 
same data with Figure 2. For the cases of 270f  , 5000v  and 300f  , 5000v  , it 
can be seen from Figure 5 that the manufacturer’s expected profit is increasing as   
increases in [0.4,1] . 
 
Figure 5     The impacts of   on the manufacturer’s expected profit 
 
Through the analysis of the manufacturer’s expected profit function, one can see that 
the change of   only affects manufacturer’s profit on his traditional channel. This effect 
is exerted by the influence of   on the wholesale price and the order quantity. When   
increases, the order quantity will increase with it. However, the wholesale price of the 
manufacturer will decrease at the same time. Even though the wholesale price and the 
order quantity have two different trends, we find that manufacturer’s expected profit is 
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monotonically increasing in . From the proof of Proposition 4.1, each unit increase in 
is associated with unit increase in order quantity. However, as becomes larger, 
each unit increase in is associated with less decrease in the wholesale price. Putting 
together, the manufacturer’s expected profit is always increasing as increases. 
5 Supply chain coordination 
Channel coordination is an important issue in dual-channel supply chains. In this section, 
we aim to design a contract to coordinate the decentralized dual-channel supply chain 
when the refund amount is endogenous. Before discussing the contract mechanism, we 
first analyse the centralized dual-channel supply chain as a benchmark model. Gan et al. 
(2004, 2005) gave a definition of coordination for supply chains involving risk-averse 
agents under VaR. We refer to their definition of coordination and give a new definition 
under the CVaR criterion. Supply chain coordination is described as follows: A supply 
chain is coordinated if the following two conditions are satisfied: 1) Each agent’s profit 
cannot be less than that in the decentralized situation; 2) The expected profit of the whole 
supply chain is equal to that in the centralized situation. Under the centralized situation, 
the decisions for the supply chain are the retailer’s order quantity and refund amount in 
the online channel, thus the profit of the centralized supply chain is as follows:     
 ( ) ( )[ ] ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )CSC r m r r r m m m mp c q p s q D p c G f D p c f s l G f D  
                  (10) 
And then the centralized supply chain’s problem is listed below: 
 
,
max [ ]CSC
q f
E    (11) 
 
,
max [ ]CSC
q f
E    (12) 
According to the KKT (Karush-Kuhn-Tucker) condition, the first-best solutions exist. 
The proof of the concavity of [ ]CSCE   with respect to ( , )q f and the first-best solutions
* *{ , }c cq f are given in the Appendix 7. 
From our definition, we can see that if a contract can coordinate the dual-channel 
supply chain with risk-averse agents, firstly it should make sure that the risk-averse 
retailer places an order 
cq
  under such contract. At the same time, the manufacturer has 
the incentive to choose the first-best refund amount *
cf . In addition, both agents’ 
performance should be Pareto improvements. As mentioned earlier, a risk-averse retailer 
undertakes double pressure from online channel’s returns service and uncertainty demand 
in the retail channel. As a result, the manufacturer should provide the required downside 
protection to the retailer so that the retailer has the incentive to increase her order 
quantity. Based on the retailer’s utility function, we find that the retailer’s risk-averse 
behaviour is mainly reflected in the expected surplus stock and the deprived demand 
from the online channel. Therefore, on one hand, the manufacturer could buy back 
retailer’s unsold products. On the other hand, the manufacturer could share a proportion 
of online channel’s revenue with the retailer. 
Thus, we design a buyback revenue-sharing contract to coordinate the decentralized 
dual-channel supply chain. The manufacturer buys back retailer’s unsold inventory at a 
buyback price b ( w ) per unit and shares a portion of the online channel’s revenue 
with the retailer. The following Proposition describes the coordination of the 
decentralized dual-channel supply chain. 
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Proposition 4.5: If the contract parameters ( *
bw , b ,  ) satisfy the following conditions: 
* ( )( )
( )
r r
b r
r
p b p c
w p
p s
 
 

and 
2
( )( )
1
( )
r r r
r r
p b p c
p s p



 
 

, 
then the buyback-revenue sharing contract can coordinate the dual-channel supply chain 
with the risk-averse retailer. 
 
Figure 6  Coordination of the dual-channel supply chain with the risk-averse retailer, (a) full 
returns policy, (b) partial returns policy 
 
 
(a)                                                              (b) 
 
The proof is given in Appendix 8. Next, we resolve the problem of Pareto 
improvements by using the numerical experiments. We assume 40s  , 60c  , 10l  , 510D 
, 
210U  , 320rp  , 300mp  , 0.2r  , 0.3m  , 0.6  , 0.7  , 0.8  and 5000v  . In 
Figure 6, we can see that there is a Pareto zone with the share proportion  in each 
situation where the optimal refund amount is full (i.e. Figure 6(a)) and partial (i.e. Figure 
6(b)).In the Pareto zone, the retailer’s expected utility and the manufacturer’s expected 
profit are both higher under the contract than those in the decentralized supply chain. The 
sum of the retailer’s and the manufacturer’s expected profit under the contract is the same 
with the total expected profit in the centralized situation.  
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6    Discussion  
We now explore two additional impacts of the consumer returns policy in the dual-
channel supply chain. Due to the difficulty of analytical analysis, we resort to numerical 
analysis. As our introduction mentioned, the manufacturer is the leader in the supply 
chain. Through opening an online channel, the manufacturer is competing with the 
retailer by carving up basic demand in the market. Besides, offering the consumer returns 
in the online channel may enhance the manufacturer’s competition and leads to more 
severe channel conflict. As a result, manufacturer encroachment and consumer returns 
policy will bring the retailer double pressure on surviving in the market. Therefore, by 
focusing on the consumer returns policy, we aim to develop insights regarding the 
following questions: How to measure the competitiveness of the manufacturer in his 
online channel? By offering the consumer returns in the online channel, what effect might 
have on the competitiveness of the online channel? In addition, it is interesting to 
investigate the impact of the refund amount on the retailer’s viability in the supply chain. 
Based on the numerical results, we firstly make the following observations.  
Observation 1: When the manufacturer offers the consumer returns policy, the 
competitiveness of the online channel in the supply chain is monotonically increasing as 
the refund amount increases. When the degree of consumer loyalty to the retail channel is 
larger, the competitiveness of the online channel is lower.  
Observation 2: When the manufacturer offers the consumer returns policy, the retailer’s 
profit share in the supply chain is increasing or firstly increasing then reducing as the 
refund amount increases. When the degree of consumer loyalty to the retail channel is 
larger, this viability becomes greater.  
First, we define a ratio ( ) /d d SCE   to evaluate the competitiveness of the online 
channel in the supply chain. ( )dE  is the expected profit of the online channel and SC  is 
the total expected profit of the supply chain. The profit of the entire supply chain 
SC  is 
regarded as a profit “pie”. We interpret 
d  as the competitiveness of the online channel 
from the angle of profit share. If 
d  is larger, the competitiveness of the online channel 
in the supply chain becomes greater. We illustrate the impact of consumer returns policy 
on 
d in Figure 7. The basic data are the same as that in Figure 2. Furthermore, we set 
2000v  and 3000v  respectively in this example to investigate the impact of 
consumer valuation uncertainty.  
 
Figure 7 The impact of f on competitiveness of online channel, (a) 2000v  , (b) 3000v   
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     (a)                                                            (b) 
 
From Figure 7 we can see that 
d  monotonically increases in f . This means larger 
refund amount leads to greater competitiveness of the online channel. The reason behind 
the above result is intuitive. Consumers are unable to actually see and inspect the 
products before purchasing. Offering the consumer returns policy can enhance 
consumers’ purchasing confidence and the competitiveness of the online channel under 
the dual-channel supply chain. For the consumer, the more generous the returns policy is, 
the more purchase intention they have. In fact, Rogers and Tibben-Lemke (1999) 
conducted a survey and found that among the respondents, 63% believe that one of the 
most important tools for Internet manufacturers/retailers to stay competitive is to offer 
clear and attractive return policies. Therefore, higher refund amount leads to greater 
competitiveness. 
When   is lower, the share of basic demand going to the direct channel (e.g.1  ) is 
relatively larger. Therefore, the competitiveness of the online channel is decreasing as   
increases. Besides, according to Proposition 4.3, the manufacturer’s optimal returns 
policies are partial returns and full returns under the data set in Figure 7(a) and 7(b) 
respectively. By comparing these two figures, we find that the competitiveness of the 
online channel is always increasing in the refund amount.   
Figure 8 verifies Observation 2. ( ) /r r SCCVaR   denotes the retailer’s profit 
share in the supply chain. This indicator is on behalf of a firm’s profitability. Chow et al. 
(2015) used minimum profit share ratio (MPSR) to define as the retailer’s profit over the 
whole supply chain profit. They mentioned that MPSR related to the retailer’s fairness 
concern. The larger 
r means the retailer’s survival ability is greater. Through Figure 8, 
we can see that when the market demand is low (e.g. 510D  ), the retailer’s profit share 
is decreasing in the refund amount f . When the market demand is moderate (e.g. 
580D  ), the retailer’s expected utility is concave in f . Recall that in the Proposition 
4.2, we give a threshold 
rf  to judge the trend of the retailer’s expected utility in f and 
the thresholds are also showed in Figure 8. When 620D  , 312.8462rf  , thus the 
retailer’s expected utility is monotonically increasing in f . Consequently, the growing 
speed of 
r  is larger when f  increases. Surprisingly, when the retailer’s basic market 
demand is relatively high (e.g. 620D  ), we find that providing the consumer returns 
policy in the online channel may benefit the retailer from both perspectives of her 
expected utility and market profit share.  
 
Figure 8     The impacts of f on retailer’s profit sharing in the supply chain, (a) 2000v  , (b) 
3000v   
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(a)                                                                      (b) 
7  Extensions 
We now consider several variations of the basic model to show that our main insights are 
robust. 
7.1 Remanufacturing the returned products 
In this section, we assume all the products returned in the online channel are 
remanufactured by the manufacturer. The unit cost of manufacturing a new product is 
nc  
and 
rc  is the unit cost of remanufacturing a returned product into a new one  with r nc c
. 
( ) ( )m r mG f D D D   is the remanufactured rate and denotes the fraction of 
remanufactured products from all products in the market. Similar to Savaskan et al. 
(2004), decisions in the supply chain can be considered in a single-period setting and the 
average unit cost of manufacturing can be written as (1 )n rc c c    .  
 
Figure 9     The impacts of   on members’ performance 
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Figure 10    The impacts of f on members’ performance, (a)manufactures’ expected profit, 
(b)retailer’s expected utility 
 
 
                               (a)                                                                                   (b) 
 
The profit of the manufacturer and the utility of the retailer and are the equilibrium 
solutions are given in Appendix 9. Due to the complexity of equilibrium solutions, we 
use numerical analysis to investigate the impacts of the retailer’s risk-averse level and the 
refund amount. The data are set as follows: 40s  , 45nc  , 42nc  , 10l  , 510D  , 210U 
, 
0.7  , 0.6  , 320rp  , 300mp  , 0.2r  , 0.3m  , 5000v  . For the given 300f 
, Figure 9 shows that when the retailer is more risk averse, both agents’ performance are 
lower. Given 0.8  , in Figure 10 (a), we can see that the manufacturer should provide 
full returns policy when the consumer has higher valuation while a partial returns policy 
is more profitable to the manufacturer if the consumer has low valuation. Figure 10 (b) 
indicates that the retailer’s expected utility may increase, decrease or first increase then 
decrease with f  increasing. In conclusion, the introduction of remanufacturing process 
does not affect our main results. 
7.2 Endogenous pricing strategy 
In this section, we consider the case when prices are endogenous. In this case, the 
manufacturer decides the wholesale price w  and the online selling prices 
mp  at first and 
then the retailer determines her order quantity
rq and the retail price rp . The objective 
functions are the same with equations (6) and (7). For any given w  and
mp , the retailer’s 
reaction functions satisfy following equations: 
 2 rr r m r
r
p w
q U f p p D U
p s
    

     

  (13) 
 
2 2( 2 )( ) 2 ( )( ) ( ) 0r m r r r r rf p p D U w p s U p w p s U p w                    (14) 
 Taking into account the retailer’s reaction functions, the manufacturer decides w and 
mp . Due to the complexity of calculation, we cannot obtain the analytical expressions of 
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w  and 
mp . Inspired by Zhang et al. (2015), we design an approximating algorithm to 
derive the approximate optimal solutions in this problem. The algorithm is given in the 
Appendix 10. 
 When the prices are endogenous, we obtain the similar results with Proposition 4.1 
about the impacts of f and   on w  and rq  and the results by the numerical experiment 
are shown in the Appendix 11. At the same time, we find that the impacts of   on the 
members’ performance continue to hold as the previous results. We then conduct a few 
comparative numerical studies to explore the characteristics of the models under two 
different pricing scenarios and identify the differences with respect to the members’ 
performance.  
  In the experiments, let 40s  , 60c  , 10l  , 510D  , 210U  , 0.7  , 0.6  , 
0.2r  , 0.3m  , 5000v  . The results are shown in Figure 11 to Figure 14, where X-
axis and Y-axis represent exogenous 
mp  and rp  respectively and the value of the prices 
is set to the certain intervals which contain the approximate optimal solutions *
mp  and 
*
rp . The approximate optimal solutions of endogenous mp  and rp  are also shown in 
every figure. Then the member’s performance under the endogenous pricing is used as a 
benchmark to obtain the performance differences between two scenarios in the Z-axis.  
       First given 0.8  , we investigate the differences of the members’ performance 
under exogenous and endogenous pricing with changes in f . From Figure 11 and 12, we 
can see that endogenize pricing does not always add value to the retailer and the 
manufacturer. This is because the freedom of price decision-making in a Stackelberg 
game will lead to more serious channel confliction and double-marginalization. Besides, 
with f  increasing, the expected utility difference of the retailer is decreasing and the 
expected profit difference of the manufacturer is increasing. This result is intuitive 
because with higher refund amount, the online channel is more appealing than the 
traditional channel and will attract more consumers. 
 
Figure 11   The differences in retailer’s expected utility under exogenous and endogenous 
price with changes in f , (a) 190f  , (b) 200f  , (c) 210f   
 
 
                      (a)                                            (b)                                               (c) 
 
Figure 12  The differences in manufacturer’ expected profit under exogenous and endogenous 
price with changes in f , (a) 190f  , (b) 200f  , (c) 210f   
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(a)                                          (b)                                              (c)  
 
Second given 210f  , we investigate the differences in the members’ performance 
under exogenous and endogenous prices with changes in  . Recall that in both 
exogenous and endogenous pricing scenarios, both members’ performance increase with 
  increasing. However, we can see that when the retailer’s risk-averse level is higher, 
both ( )rCVaR  and ( )mE   decreases in Figure 13 and 14. This result also indicates 
when the manufacturer and the retailer set their optimal prices, both members response 
more rapidly to the change of  . Although the retailer’s expected utility and the 
manufacturer’s expected profit increase with   increasing in the exogenous pricing 
scenario, compared with it, both members’ performance raise more quickly in the 
endogenous pricing scenario. Therefore the differences of the performance ( )rCVaR 
and ( )mE   will go down instead. 
 
Figure 13  The differences in retailer’s expected utility under exogenous and endogenous 
price with changes in  , (a) 0.7  , (b) 0.8  , (c) 0.9   
 
 
 (a)                                             (b)                                         (c)  
 
Figure 14    The differences in manufacturer’ expected profit under the exogenous and endogenous 
price with changes in  , (a) 0.7  , (b) 0.8  , (c) 0.9   
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 (a)                                            (b)                                                   (c)  
8 Conclusion 
In this paper, we develop a dual-channel supply chain consisting of a risk-neutral 
manufacturer and a risk-averse retailer. The manufacturer offers a consumer returns 
policy in the online channel, in which consumers face valuation uncertainty. We use 
conditional value-at-risk (CVaR) criterion to evaluate the risk-averse behaviour of the 
retailer. We examine how customer returns policy and risk-averse behaviour influence 
the equilibrium solutions and supply chain agents’ performance. 
It is found that the degree of the retailer’s risk aversion will affect the agents’ optimal 
decisions and their performance. A higher risk-averse indicator (i.e. less risk-averse 
behaviour) leads to larger order quantity and lower wholesale price. If the retailer is more 
risk-averse, both agents’ performance will decrease monotonically. One of our main 
conclusions is that the manufacturer’s optimal returns policy is related to the consumer 
types. Facing with the low-valuation type, the manufacturer should offer a partial returns 
policy. Under this situation, a full returns policy is so generous that the manufacturer has 
to bear too much costs of returns. On the contrary, the manufacturer is motivated to offer 
a generous full returns policy to attract high type consumers. If the consumer has 
moderate valuation of the product, the optimal returns policy depends on the retailer’s 
risk-averse level. What surprises us is that the retailer’s expected utility may 
monotonically increase in the refund amount under the double pressure of manufacturer 
encroachment and returns service. We obtained a set of threshold values to characterize 
the relationship between the retailer’s expected utility and the manufacturer’s refund 
amount, which can be used to determine when the retailer would achieve the maximum 
expected utility under a given risk-averse level. In addition, a buyback revenue-sharing 
contract is developed to coordinate the decentralized dual-channel supply chain in 
relation to the centralized benchmark model. Numerical examples verified our analytical 
results. In addition, we use two numerical studies to investigate the impacts of the refund 
amount on the competitiveness of the online channel and on the retailer’s viability in the 
supply chain.  
 Further research may be done in the following directions. First, we only consider the 
situation in which the retailer has risk-averse behaviour, it may also be interesting to 
investigate the situations that both agents have risk-averse behaviour in a dual-channel 
supply chain. Second, the information asymmetry in the supply chain and its impact on 
the agents’ decisions may worth further investigation.  
   
 
   
   
 
   
   
 
   
    Analyzing Consumer Returns Policy in a Dual-channel Supply Chain     
 
 
    
 
 
   
   
 
   
   
 
   
       
 
Acknowledgements 
 
The authors are grateful to the editors and the three anonymous reviewers for their 
valuable and constructive comments. This work is supported by the National Nature 
Science Foundation of China under Grant No.71472133. 
References 
Adan, I. J. and Van der Wal, J. (1998) ‘Combining make to order and make to stock’, OR 
Spectrum, Vol. 20 No. 2, pp. 73-81. 
Alexander, G. J. and Baptista, A. M. (2004) ‘A comparison of VaR and CVaR constraints 
on portfolio selection with the mean-variance model’, Management Science, Vol. 50 
No. 9, pp. 1261-1273. 
Arya, A., Mittendorf, B. and Sappington, D. E. (2007) ‘The bright side of supplier 
encroachment’, Marketing Science, Vol. 26 No. 5, pp. 651-659. 
Bhatnagar, A. and Syam, S. S. (2014) ‘Allocating a hybrid retailer’s assortment across 
retail stores: Bricks-and-mortar vs online’, Journal of Business Research, Vol. 67 
No. 6, pp. 1293-1302. 
Bose, I. and An and, P. (2007) ‘On returns policies with exogenous price’, European 
Journal of Operational Research, Vol. 178 No. 3, pp. 782-788. 
Brynjolfsson, E. and Smith, M. D. (2000) ‘Frictionless commerce? A comparison of 
Internet and conventional retailers’, Management science, Vol. 46 No. 4, pp. 563-
585. 
Cai, G. G., Zhang, Z. G. and Zhang, M. (2009) ‘Game theoretical perspectives on dual-
channel supply chain competition with price discounts and pricing 
schemes’, International Journal of Production Economics, Vol. 117 No. 1, pp. 80-
96. 
Carr, S. and Duenyas, I. (2000) ‘Optimal Admission Control and Sequencing in a Make-
to-stock/Make-to-order Production System’, Operations Research, Vol. 48 No. 5, 
pp. 709-720. 
Cattani, K., Gilland, W., Heese, H. S. and Swaminathan, J. (2006) ‘Boiling Frogs: Pricing 
Strategies for a Manufacturer Adding a Direct Channel That Competes with the 
Traditional Channel’, Production and Operations Management, Vol. 15 No. 1, pp. 
40-56. 
Chiang, W. Y. K., Chhajed, D. and Hess, J. D. (2003) ‘Direct Marketing Indirect Profits: 
A Strategic Analysis of Dual-channel Supply Chain Design’, Management 
Science, Vol. 49 No. 1, pp. 1-20. 
Chen, J. and Bell, P. C. (2012) ‘Implementing market segmentation using full-refund and 
no-refund customer returns policies in a dual-channel supply chain 
structure’, International Journal of Production Economics, Vol. 136 No. 1, pp. 56-
66. 
Chen, J. and Grewal, R. (2013) ‘Competing in a supply chain via full-refund and no-
refund customer returns policies’, International Journal of Production 
Economics, Vol. 146 No. 1, pp. 246-258. 
   
 
   
   
 
   
   
 
   
    Y.Jiang et al.    
 
    
 
 
   
   
 
   
   
 
   
       
 
Choi, T. M., Li, D. and Yan, H. (2008) ‘Mean-variance analysis of a single supplier and 
retailer supply chain under a returns policy’, European Journal of Operational 
Research, Vol. 184 No. 1, pp. 356-376. 
Choi, T. M., Liu, N., Ren, S. and Hui, C. L. (2013) ‘No refund or full refund: when 
should a fashion brand offer full refund consumer return service for mass 
customization products?’, Mathematical Problems in Engineering 
[online] http://dx.doi.org/10.1155/2013/561846 (accepted 6 February 2013) 
Chow, P. S., Wang, Y., Choi, T. M. and Shen, B. (2015) ‘An experimental study on the 
effects of minimum profit share on supply chains with markdown contract: Risk and 
profit analysis’, Omega, Vol. 57, pp. 85-97. 
Collinger, T. (1998) ‘Lines separating sales channels blur: Manufacturers, direct sellers, 
retailers invade each other’s turf’ Advertising Age, Vol. 30, pp. 34. 
Crocker, K. J., and Letizia, P. (2014) ‘Optimal policies for recovering the value of 
consumer returns’, Production and Operations Management,  Vol. 23 No. 10, pp. 
1667-1680. 
Dan, B., Xu, G. and Liu, C.  (2012) ‘Pricing policies in a dual-channel supply chain with 
retail services’, International Journal of Production Economics, Vol. 139 No. 1, pp. 
312-320. 
Gan, X., Sethi, S. P. and Yan, H. (2004) ‘Coordination of supply chains with risk-averse 
agents’, Production and Operations Management, Vol. 13, No. 2, pp. 135-149. 
Gan, X., Sethi, S. P. and Yan, H. (2005) ‘Channel coordination with a risk-neutral 
supplier and a downside-risk-averse retailer’, Production and Operations 
Management, Vol. 14 No. 1, pp. 80-89. 
Hsiao, L. and Chen, Y. J. (2012) ‘Returns Policy and Quality Risk in E-
Business’, Production and Operations Management, Vol. 21 No. 3, pp. 489-503. 
Hsiao, L. and Chen, Y. J. (2013) ‘The perils of selling online: Manufacturer competition, 
channel conflict, and consumer preferences’, Marketing Letters, Vol. 24 No. 3, pp. 
277-292. 
Hua, G., Wang, S. and Cheng, T. E. (2010) ‘Price and lead time decisions in dual-channel 
supply chains’ , European Journal of Operational Research, Vol. 205 No. 1, pp. 
113-126. 
Huang, S. and Yang, J. (2015) ‘Contracting under asymmetric customer returns 
information and market valuation with advertising-dependent demand’, European 
Journal of Industrial Engineering, Vol. 9 No. 4, pp. 538-560. 
Khouja, M., Park, S. and Zhou, J. (2013) ‘A free gift card alternative to price discounts in 
the newsvendor problem’, Omega, Vol. 41 No. 4, pp. 665-678. 
Lau, H. S. and Lau, A. H. L. (1999) ‘Manufacturer’s pricing strategy and return policy 
for a single-period commodity’, European Journal of Operational 
Research, Vol. 116 No. 2, pp. 291-304. 
Lee, P. M. (2002) ‘behavioural model of online purchasers in e-commerce 
environment’, Electronic Commerce Research, Vol. 2 No. 1-2, pp. 75-85. 
Li, B., Chen, P., Li, Q. H. and Wang, W. G. (2014) ‘Dual-channel supply chain pricing 
decisions with a risk-averse retailer’, International Journal of Production 
Research, Vol. 52 No. 23, pp. 7132-7147. 
Li, Y., Xu, L. and Li, D.  (2013) ‘Examining relationships between the return policy, 
product quality, and pricing strategy in online direct selling’, International Journal 
of Production Economics, Vol. 144 No. 2, pp. 451-460. 
Comment [a1]: There is no issue 
number in this paper. 
   
 
   
   
 
   
   
 
   
    Analyzing Consumer Returns Policy in a Dual-channel Supply Chain     
 
 
    
 
 
   
   
 
   
   
 
   
       
 
Li, Y., Xu, L., Choi, T. M. and Govindan, K.  (2014) ‘Optimal advance-selling strategy 
for fashionable products with opportunistic consumers returns’, Systems, Man, and 
Cybernetics: Systems, IEEE Transactions on, Vol. 44 No. 7, pp. 938-952. 
Li, Z., Gilbert, S. M. and Lai, G. (2014) ‘Supplier encroachment under asymmetric 
information’, Management Science, Vol. 60 No. 2, pp. 449-462. 
Li, Z., Gilbert, S. M. and Lai, G.  (2015) ‘Supplier encroachment as an enhancement or a 
hindrance to nonlinear pricing’, Production and Operations Management, Vol. 15 
No. 1, pp. 89-109. 
Liu, N., Choi, T. M., Yuen, C. W. M. and Ng, F. (2012) ‘Optimal pricing, modularity, 
and return policy under mass customization’, Systems, Man and Cybernetics, Part 
A: Systems and Humans, IEEE Transactions on, Vol. 42 No. 3, pp. 604-614. 
Liu, J., Mantin, B. and Wang, H. (2014) ‘Supply chain coordination with customer 
returns and refund-dependent demand’, International Journal of Production 
Economics, Vol. 148, pp. 81-89. 
Liu, J. and He, Y. (2013) ‘Coordinating a Supply Chain with Risk-Averse Agents under 
Demand and Consumer Returns Uncertainty.’ Mathematical Problems in 
Engineering[online] http://dx.doi.org/10.1155/2013/289572 (accepted 10 September 
2013) 
Lo, S. K., Chou, Y. J. and Teng, C. I. (2013) ‘Source effect of advertised reference price 
influences on transaction value in online shopping environments’, Electronic 
Commerce Research, Vol. 13 No. 4, pp. 411-421. 
Lu, Q. and Liu, N. (2013) ‘Pricing games of mixed conventional and e-commerce 
distribution channels.’ Computers & Industrial Engineering, Vol. 64 No. 1, pp. 122-
132. 
Ma, L., Liu, F., Li, S. and Yan, H. (2012) ‘Channel bargaining with risk-averse retailer’, 
International Journal of Production Economics, Vol. 139 No. 1, pp. 155-167. 
Machlis, S. (1998) ‘Channel conflicts stall web sales.’ Computer world, Vol. 32 No. 7, 
pp. 2. 
Markowitz, H. (1959) Portfolio Selection: Efficient Diversification of Investment. New 
Haven, NH: Yale University Press. 
Moon, Y. and Yao, T. (2013) ‘Investment timing for a dual channel supply chain’, 
European Journal of Industrial Engineering, Vol. 7 No. 2, pp. 148-174. 
Rao, S., Rabinovich, E. and Raju, D. (2014) ‘The role of physical distribution services as 
determinants of product returns in Internet retailing’, Journal of Operations 
Management, Vol. 32 No. 6, pp. 295-312. 
Ren, L., He, Y. and Song, H. (2014) ‘Price and Service Competition of Dual-Channel 
Supply Chain with Consumer Returns’, Discrete Dynamics in Nature and Society 
[online] http://dx.doi.org/10.1155/2014/565603 (accepted 21 December 2013) 
Rockafellar, R. T. and Uryasev, S. (2000) ‘Optimization of Conditional Value-at-risk’, 
Journal of Risk, Vol. 2, pp. 21-41. 
Rockafellar, R. T. and Uryasev, S. (2002) ‘Conditional value-at-risk for general loss 
distributions’, Journal of Banking & Finance, Vol. 26 No. 7, pp. 1443-1471. 
Rogers, D. S. and Tibben-Lembke, R. S. (1999) Going backwards: reverse logistics 
trends and practices. Pittsburgh, PA: Reverse Logistics Executive Council. 
Ruiz-Benitez, R. and Muriel, A. (2014) ‘Consumer returns in a decentralized supply 
chain’, International Journal of Production Economics, Vol. 147, pp. 573-592. 
Comment [a2]: There is no issue 
number in this paper. 
   
 
   
   
 
   
   
 
   
    Y.Jiang et al.    
 
    
 
 
   
   
 
   
   
 
   
       
 
Savaskan, R. C., Bhattacharya, S. and Van Wassenhove, L. N. (2004) ‘Closed-loop 
supply chain models with product remanufacturing’, Management science, Vol. 50 
No. 2, pp. 239-252. 
Shulman, J. D., Coughlan, A. T. and Savaskan, R. C. (2010) ‘Optimal reverse channel 
structure for consumer product returns’, Marketing Science, Vol. 29 No. 6, pp. 1071-
1085. 
Su, X. (2009) ‘Consumer returns policies and supply chain performance’, Manufacturing 
& Service Operations Management, Vol. 11 No. 4, pp. 595-612. 
Sullivan, E. A. (2009) ‘Guaranteeing Success’, Marketing News, Vol. 43 No. 8, pp. 20. 
Sun, X., Li, Y., Govindan, K. and Zhou, Y.  (2013) ‘Integrating dynamic acquisition 
pricing and remanufacturing decisions under random price-sensitive returns’, The 
International Journal of Advanced Manufacturing Technology, Vol. 68 No. 1-4, pp. 
933-947. 
Suwelack, T., Hogreve, J. and Hoyer, W. D. (2011) ‘Understanding money-back 
guarantees: cognitive, affective, and behavioural outcomes’, Journal of 
Retailing, Vol. 87 No. 4, pp. 462-478. 
Tang, F. F. and Xing, X. (2001) ‘Will the growth of multi-channel retailing diminish the 
pricing efficiency of the web?’ Journal of Retailing, Vol. 77 No. 3, pp. 319-333. 
Trager, I. (2000) ‘Not so many happy returns’, Interactive Week, Vol. 7 No. 11, pp. 44-
45. 
Tsay, A. A. and Agrawal, N. (2004) ‘Channel Conflict and Coordination in the E-
commerce Age’, Production and Operations Management, Vol. 13 No. 1, pp. 93-
110. 
Wen, U. P., Chen, Y. C. and Cheung, K. H. (2013) ‘Equal Pricing Strategies in a Dual 
Channel Supply Chain’, Wang, J. (Eds.), Optimizing, Innovating, and Capitalizing 
on Information Systems for Operations, IGI Global, pp. 230-249. 
Wood, S. L. (2001) ‘Remote purchase environments: the influence of return policy 
leniency on two-stage decision processes’, Journal of Marketing Research, Vol. 38 
No. 2, pp. 157-169. 
Xiao, T. J., Shi, K. R. and Yang, D. Q. (2010) ‘Coordination of a supply chain with 
consumer return under demand uncertainty’, International Journal of Production 
Economics, Vol. 124 No. 1, pp. 171-180. 
Xiong, Y., Yan, W., Fernandes, K., Xiong, Z. K. and Guo, N. (2012) ‘ ‘Bricks vs. 
Clicks’: The impact of manufacturer encroachment with a dealer leasing and selling 
of durable goods’, European Journal of Operational Research, Vol. 217 No. 1, pp. 
75-83. 
Yoo, S. H. (2014) ‘Product quality and return policy in a supply chain under risk aversion 
of a supplier’, International Journal of Production Economics, Vol. 154, pp. 146-
155. 
Yue, X. and Liu, J. (2006) ‘Demand forecast sharing in a dual-channel supply 
chain’, European Journal of Operational Research, Vol. 174 No. 1, pp. 646-667. 
Zhang, J., Liu, G., Zhang, Q., and Bai, Z. (2015) ‘Coordinating a supply chain for 
deteriorating items with a revenue sharing and cooperative investment contract’, 
Omega, Vol. 56, pp. 37-49. 
Zhu, S. and Fukushima, M. (2009) ‘Worst-case conditional value-at-risk with application 
to robust portfolio management’, Operations Research, Vol. 57 No. 5, pp. 1155-
1168. 
 
